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COMBATING HINDSIGHT RECONSTRUCTION IN PATENT 
PROSECUTION 
ABSTRACT 
The common saying “hindsight is 20–20” rings true in many different 
areas; in patent law specifically, hindsight bias has the potential to affect a 
patent examiner’s determination of whether an invention is “obvious” under 
35 U.S.C. § 103. The examiner may permissibly rely upon a combination of 
prior art references to find that a claim would have been obvious to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art. However, the examiner may not use “that 
which only the inventor taught . . . against its teacher.” Structural flaws within 
the examination process place pressure upon examiners to reject claims upon 
first examination, regardless of the content of those claims. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. rejected the patent 
applicant’s primary guard against hindsight bias: the Federal Circuit’s 
teaching-suggestion-motivation test as the sole test for obviousness. This has 
left the patent applicant with little to combat obviousness rejections based on 
hindsight bias but the “secondary considerations” of Graham v. John Deere 
Co. of Kansas City, which are rarely available at the prosecution stage. 
This Comment proposes a framework that focuses on the question of 
whether an examiner has impermissibly relied upon hindsight to combine 
references in determining obviousness. This framework provides an avenue for 
discussion between the patent examiner and the prosecuting attorney and 
provides substance to be considered by decisionmakers on appeal. The intent 
of the framework is to consider whether the examiner conducted the process of 
the examination in a fair and reasonable manner with full appreciation of what 
a person having ordinary skill in the art would have concluded when faced 
with the prior art. The proposed framework puts forward ten factors which 
should be considered in the totality of the circumstances, similar to the Wands 
factors for enablement or the DuPont factors for likelihood of confusion in 
Trademark Law.  
These ten factors are not intended as an all-inclusive list but as examples of 
inquiries that may bear on the question of hindsight, of which there are likely 
many more. The adoption of this framework may increase the burden on 
examiners as well as their supervisors, but this Comment argues that the 
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benefit of adopting this framework, providing recourse to patent applicants 
who may be unfairly deprived of patent claims they deserve, outweighs the 
cost. The rejection of nonobvious patent applications thwarts one of the 
primary purposes of patent law: incentivizing innovation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Empirical studies have shown that, once aware of an invention, jurors are 
much more likely to find that the invention would have been obvious.1 This 
Comment explores the effect of that type of hindsight bias not on jurors during 
a trial but instead on obviousness determinations during patent examination. 
To obtain a patent, the rule has long been established that the claimed subject 
matter must be nonobvious. The 1952 Patent Act required that the patent 
examiner determine whether the invention in the patent application would have 
been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) at the 
time of invention.2 If so, the invention did not meet the requirements for 
patentability.3 After the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act went into force in 
2013, the timing has changed: the standard is now whether the invention would 
have been obvious to a PHOSITA at the time of filing.4 For the purposes of 
this Comment, though, the underlying theme is the same: according to the text 
of the statute, the examiner must view the claimed invention from a point in 
time prior to its examination when determining obviousness. 
Viewing the claimed invention at the time of filing the patent application—
or at the time of invention—is problematic since “[h]umans are cognitively 
incapable of ignoring what they have learned . . . as required for the proper ex 
ante analysis.”5 This phenomenon is commonly called the “hindsight bias.”6 In 
the context of patent prosecution, “[o]nce the [examiner] knows that the 
invention exists today, it can be difficult to prevent hindsight bias from 
affecting the [examiner’s] analysis” of the nonobviousness requirement.7 
Reliance upon hindsight creates a bias against patentability because the 
 
 1 See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight 
Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006). 
 2 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 103, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (“A patent may not be obtained . . . if the 
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter 
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in 
the art to which said subject matter pertains.”). 
 3 See id. 
 4 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(c), 125 Stat. 284, 287 (2011) (“A patent 
for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior 
art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of 
the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.”). 
 5 Mandel, supra note 1, at 1400. 
 6 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 7 Natalie A. Thomas, Note, Secondary Considerations in Nonobviousness Analysis: The Use of 
Objective Indicia Following KSR v. Teleflex, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2076 n.29 (2011). 
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examiner views the invention as it exists and therefore merely as a trivial 
advance in the start of the art. 
Courts and legal scholars have struggled to formulate a test for 
nonobviousness that compensates for the possibility that an examiner has 
impermissibly “take[n] into account the ex post fact that the invention was 
actually achieved”8 to reject patent claims as obvious. Current patent 
applicants who suspect the presence of hindsight bias in their rejections for 
obviousness have few avenues through which to address their concerns beyond 
arguing technical distinctions. For that reason, this Comment proposes a 
framework for determining whether an examiner has impermissibly relied 
upon hindsight in her rejection. The framework includes a number of factors 
that can weigh in favor of (or against) hindsight while considering whether the 
examination process was conducted in a fair and reasonable manner, with full 
appreciation of what a PHOSITA would have concluded when faced with the 
cited prior art. 
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the history of 
nonobviousness and the standards that courts have developed to combat 
reliance upon impermissible hindsight. Part II examines the process of patent 
examination and the difficulties encountered in patent prosecution after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. It also 
explains why objective indicia of nonobviousness are an impractical solution 
to the hindsight problem in the context of patent prosecution. Part III proposes 
the framework for determining whether an examiner has employed 
impermissible hindsight to reject claims as obvious under Section 103 by 
considering a number of factors, most of which are directed toward the process 
of examination. Finally, Part IV analyzes the potential impact on patent 
prosecution and appeals if the proposed test were adopted. 
I. THE REQUIREMENT OF NONOBVIOUSNESS 
Since 1793, the requirements for patentability of an invention have 
included novelty and utility.9 As the patent system developed, however, the 
judiciary began to acknowledge a need for an additional element.10 This 
judge-made element would further the goal of incentivizing innovation by 
 
 8 Mandel, supra note 1, at 1393. 
 9 See Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318. 
 10 See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850) (“[T]he improvement is the 
work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.”). 
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protecting only substantial advances in the state of the art rather than natural 
technological evolution. In early cases such as Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, courts 
required “that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements 
of every invention” for an advance to be patentable.11 The standard of what 
constituted an “invention” was never clear,12 which prompted lawmakers to 
take notice. Section A of this Part describes the passage as well as early 
interpretation of the Patent Act of 1952 in the seminal case of Graham v. John 
Deere Co. of Kansas City and its successor cases. Next, section B chronicles 
the Federal Circuit’s development of the teaching-suggestion-motivation 
(TSM) test for obviousness and describes the ways in which that test was a 
helpful guard against the hindsight bias. Finally, section C explains the 
Supreme Court’s rejection of the TSM test as the sole test for obviousness in 
KSR and its insistence on a more flexible standard. 
A. Passage and Initial Interpretation of the Patent Act of 1952 
Congress first codified the nonobviousness requirement for patentability in 
Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 (1952 Act). The drafters of the 1952 Act 
aimed to avoid the use of the word “invention” as a term of art indicating a 
separate requirement for patentability; instead, the statute requires that an 
invention be nonobvious.13 Today,14 Section 103 states as follows: 
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, 
notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed 
as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed 
invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a 
whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the 
 
 11 Id. 
 12 See Atlas Scraper & Eng’g Co. v. Pursche, 300 F.2d 467, 472 (9th Cir. 1961) (“It is a trite saying that 
invention defies definition. Yet, through long use, the word has acquired certain characteristics which at least 
give direction to its meaning. Invention is a concept; a thing evolved from the mind. It is not a revelation of 
something which exists and was unknown, but is the creation of something which did not exist before, 
possessing the elements of novelty and utility in kind and measure different from and greater than what the art 
might expect from its skilled workers.” (quoting Pyrene Mfg. Co. v. Boyce, 292 F. 480, 481 (3d Cir. 1923)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted)); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. & Christian T. Johnson, Not So Obvious After All: 
Patent Law’s Nonobviousness Requirement, KSR, and the Fear of Hindsight Bias, 47 GA. L. REV. 41, 57 
(2012) (“[T]he courts . . . struggled to define whether an advance was sufficient in any case to constitute an 
invention . . . .”); Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention” as Replaced by Sec. 103 of the 1952 Patent 
Act, 46 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 855, 860 (1964) (noting the “proliferation of views on what did and did not amount 
to invention went on for 100 years” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 13 See Rich, supra note 12, at 865. 
 14 As noted in the Introduction, the significant difference in the current statute and the Patent Act of 1952 
is the point in time at which obviousness is considered. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text. 
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claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which 
the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by 
the manner in which the invention was made.15 
In drafting Section 103, “Congress apparently intended to restate the basic 
Hotchkiss test with the emphasis on obviousness.”16 However, the term 
“obviousness” has proven as difficult to define as its predecessor “invention.” 
Congress attempted to define obviousness as that which would have been 
obvious to a PHOSITA but provided little guidance on how the standard 
should be applied. 
The Supreme Court first explored the constitutional boundaries for 
determining patentability based on obviousness in the seminal case of Graham 
v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City.17 The Court began its analysis by noting that 
the starting point for federal patent power must be the Constitution,18 which 
authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . 
Discoveries.”19 Regardless of the congressional intent of the 1952 Act, 
Congress could not overstep the boundaries set by the Constitution.20 Within 
those boundaries, though, Congress may “select[] the policy which in its 
judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim.”21 The 1952 Act did just that 
by adding for the first time an express requirement of nonobviousness for 
patentability.22 The Court concluded that the “general level of patentable 
invention” was not affected by Section 103 of the 1952 Act, which was 
intended to codify earlier judicial precedents.23 
The Court also articulated a four-factor test for determining 
nonobviousness in Graham. First, a factfinder must determine “the scope and 
content of the prior art.”24 This step is necessary before advancing to the next 
step of ascertaining the “differences between the prior art and the claims at 
 
 15 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 16 Charles R. Haworth, Note, Patentability—Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 Construed, 44 TEX. L. 
REV. 1405, 1407 (1966); see Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1966). However, there 
is also evidence in the legislative history that Section 103 may have been a revision of the Hotchkiss standard. 
See, e.g., Rich, supra note 12. 
 17 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
 18 See id. at 5. 
 19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 20 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6. 
 21 Id. at 6. 
 22 See id. at 15. 
 23 See id. at 16–17. 
 24 Id. at 17. 
BOLT GALLEYSPROOFS2 3/19/2015 9:47 AM 
2015] COMBATING HINDSIGHT RECONSTRUCTION 1143 
issue.”25 In other words, the decisionmaker must determine what the prior art is 
and whether it is different than the newly claimed invention. Third, the 
factfinder must determine “the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.”26 
This third consideration is important because the terms of the statute require 
that obviousness be judged from the point of view of a PHOSITA.27 Finally, 
the factfinder may utilize “secondary considerations . . . to give light to the 
circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter.”28 These secondary 
considerations might include “commercial success, long felt but unsolved 
needs, [or] failure of others.”29 Secondary considerations may also be called 
“indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness.”30 
Secondary considerations can simplify the complex technical material often 
present in patent cases.31 They also attempt to guard against courts 
impermissibly relying on hindsight bias.32 The Court noted that the test for 
nonobviousness would still be difficult to apply, even under this framework, 
since opinions as to obviousness will surely differ in any factual scenario.33 
But because the judiciary routinely faces complicated inquiries in other fields 
of law, it should be able to apply the same skills in the context of 
nonobviousness.34 
The Supreme Court soon revisited the nonobviousness requirement to 
clarify that simply combining elements previously known in the art does not 
make an invention nonobvious.35 In Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement 
Salvage Co., the patent at issue was a new combination of known elements for 
laying asphalt: a radiant heat burner, a spreading mechanism, and a shaping 
device.36 The Court concluded that all elements were previously known in the 
 
 25 Id. Prior art is defined as “[k]nowledge that is publicly known, used by others, or available on the date 
of invention to a person of ordinary skill in an art.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 133 (10th ed. 2014). 
 26 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. 
 27 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 28 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. 
 29 Id. at 17. This list of secondary considerations is not exhaustive; courts have identified additional 
factors as well. See KIMBERLY A. MOORE, TIMOTHY R. HOLBROOK & JOHN F. MURPHY, PATENT LITIGATION 
AND STRATEGY 717 (4th ed. 2013). 
 30 Graham, 383 U.S. at 18. 
 31 See Emer Simic, The TSM Test Is Dead! Long Live the TSM Test! The Aftermath of KSR, What Was 
All the Fuss About?, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 227, 231 (2009). 
 32 See id. 
 33 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 18. 
 34 See id. (using negligence and scienter as examples). 
 35 See Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969); see also Sakraida v. 
Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976). 
 36 See Anderson’s-Black Rock, 396 U.S. at 58. 
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art and that to combine them would have been obvious to a PHOSITA.37 This 
was especially true given that the combination did not produce a new or 
unexpected result.38 Perhaps most importantly, the presence of secondary 
factors like commercial success and fulfillment of a long felt but unsolved 
need were, “without invention,” not enough to satisfy the patentability 
standards.39 Similarly, the Court held in Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc. that the 
“patent simply arrange[d] old elements with each performing the same 
function it had been known to perform, although perhaps producing a more 
striking result than in previous combinations.”40 The combination did not 
satisfy the nonobviousness requirement of patentability because the function of 
each element remained the same.41 
B. The Development of the TSM Test as a Guard Against Hindsight Bias 
The three cases described in section A, above, seemed to set a relatively 
high standard for patentability, but it was just that—a standard—which the 
Federal Circuit came to view as an inadequate guard against the danger of 
hindsight bias in nonobviousness determinations. When the Federal Circuit 
was established in 1982 and given national jurisdiction over nearly all patent 
matters,42 it quickly became clear that this court preferred well-defined rules to 
nebulous standards. During patent examination, explained in Part II,43 patent 
examiners view the claims of the application, gather a pool of references, and 
utilize those references as prior art to reject the claims in the application. The 
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure permits the examiner to combine prior 
art references to find each limitation of the claim when determining 
obviousness.44 The Federal Circuit feared the possibility of hindsight bias 
affecting such combinations45 and as a result began to develop the 
teaching-suggestion-motivation test for finding a patent obvious.46 The TSM 
 
 37 See id. at 60–61. 
 38 See id. 
 39 Id. at 61 (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 153 (1950)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
 40 Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 282. 
 41 See id. 
 42 See Court Jurisdiction, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-
court/court-jurisdiction.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2015). 
 43 See infra Part II. 
 44 See MPEP § 2143 (9th ed., Mar. 2014). 
 45 See Thomas, supra note 7, at 2076 n.29. 
 46 See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In re Kahn, 441 
F.3d 977, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In re Huston, 308 F.3d 1267, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Dembiczak, 175 
BOLT GALLEYSPROOFS2 3/19/2015 9:47 AM 
2015] COMBATING HINDSIGHT RECONSTRUCTION 1145 
test required an examiner to show that, at the time of invention, there existed 
some teaching, suggestion, or motivation that would prompt the PHOSITA to 
combine the elements of the prior art to yield the claimed invention.47 The 
teaching, suggestion, or motivation could come from the prior art, the 
PHOSITA’s knowledge, or the nature of the problem.48 The Federal Circuit 
maintained that “the best defense against the subtle but powerful attraction of a 
hindsight-based obviousness analysis is rigorous application” of the TSM 
test.49 
In 1992, the Federal Circuit expressed an early formulation of the TSM test 
in In re Oetiker.50 In this case, the inventor claimed a metal hose clamp that 
featured a “preassembly hook.”51 The examiner rejected the inventor’s claims 
as obvious in view of earlier metal hose clamps combined with art from the 
garment industry that utilized hook-and-eye fasteners.52 The court concluded 
that the invention was not obvious because a PHOSITA in metal hose clamps 
would not “reasonably be expected or motivated” to consult the teachings of 
the garment industry.53 The court also noted that “it is necessary to 
consider . . . common sense [when] deciding in which fields a [PHOSITA] 
would reasonably be expected to look for a solution to the problem facing the 
inventor.”54 The court went on to express one of the earlier formulations of the 
TSM test by requiring “some reason, suggestion, or motivation found in the 
prior art whereby a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention would 
make the combination.”55 
The Federal Circuit revisited the issue in In re Kemps, a case about “a 
method of removing old asphalt concrete containing a stone fraction.”56 The 
examiner rejected the claimed invention as obvious in view of two United 
States patents that each disclosed one or more elements of the claim at issue.57 
 
F.3d 994, 998–99 (Fed. Cir. 1999); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 1998); 
In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 47 See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 987–88. 
 48 See id.; Simic, supra note 31, at 231–32. 
 49 In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 999. 
 50 977 F.2d 1443. 
 51 Id. at 1446 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 52 See id. 
 53 Id. at 1447. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 97 F.3d 1427, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 57 See id. at 1429 (citing U.S. Patent No. 4,226,552 (filed May 17, 1978) and U.S. Patent No. 4,793,730 
(filed Aug. 13, 1984)). 
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The motivation to combine prior art references in this case could be found in 
the prior art itself. One patent taught the “heating of asphalt concrete with a 
hood heated by gas burners, the breaking up of the heated asphalt with a 
scarifying element, and the scraping away of the heated asphalt with a 
blade.”58 A second patent taught “a similar process in which steam [was] used 
to heat the asphalt surface.”59 The second patent specifically noted the 
disadvantages associated with the gas burning process and taught the use of 
steam to overcome those complications.60 Therefore, the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) properly rejected the new application as obvious 
under 35 U.S.C. § 103.61 
The Federal Circuit applied the TSM test even more strictly in In re 
Dembiczak.62 The inventors had designed a large trash bag made from orange 
plastic and printed with a design that made it resemble a jack-o’-lantern when 
full.63 The court focused its decision in this case on hindsight, emphasizing that 
determining whether an invention is obvious “requires the oft-difficult but 
critical step of casting the mind back to the time of invention, to consider the 
thinking of [a PHOSITA], guided only by the prior art references and the 
then-accepted wisdom in the field.”64 In cases such as this, where the invention 
was less complex and was developed with relative ease, examiners and courts 
must be even more careful not to “fall victim to the insidious effect of a 
hindsight syndrome wherein that which only the inventor taught is used against 
its teacher.”65 Though the suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine 
usually comes from the prior art references, it may also come from the 
knowledge of the PHOSITA or the type of problem being solved.66 Wherever 
the evidence originates, though, it must clearly and particularly show the 
teaching, suggestion, or motivation.67 In other words, “[b]road conclusory 
statements regarding the teaching of multiple references” are not enough to 
 
 58 Id.; see ’552 Patent. 
 59 In re Kemps, 97 F.3d at 1429; see ’730 Patent. 
 60 See In re Kemps, 97 F.3d at 1429–30. 
 61 See id. For another example in which the Federal Circuit found explicit TSM to combine references, 
see In re Huston, 308 F.3d 1267, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 62 175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 63 See id. at 996. 
 64 Id. at 999. 
 65 Id. (quoting W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 66 See id. 
 67 See id. 
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prove obviousness.68 In this case, the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences (Board) combined children’s art references with conventional 
trash bag references but did not specifically identify any TSM to combine 
those references.69 The Board instead limited its discussion to ways that the 
prior art could be combined to read on each and every limitation of the claimed 
invention,70 which was not enough to sustain its conclusion of obviousness.71 
The Federal Circuit required the Board to explicitly state a finding of TSM, 
which the Board failed to do.72 
Throughout this line of cases, the Federal Circuit arguably “lowered the bar 
for nonobviousness, resulting in the issuance of many patents that should [have 
been] invalid.”73 By moving toward requiring an express statement of a 
teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine in the prior art itself, the court 
lowered the standard for nonobviousness: if a combination were obvious, the 
prior art probably would not feel the need to expressly articulate the 
suggestion.74 For twenty-five years, the Supreme Court “refused all invitations 
to reexamine the Federal Circuit’s doctrinal developments” concerning the 
nonobviousness requirement, so the TSM test persisted.75 During that time, 
though, the TSM test and patentability standards in general were not without 
their critics. Newspapers, scientific journals, and legal scholars took notice of 
the patents being upheld for trivial inventions.76 
 
 68 Id. 
 69 See id. at 1000. 
 70 If the prior art “reads on” every limitation of the claimed invention, then every element of the claimed 
invention is present in the prior art; here, the court found every element of the claimed invention somewhere in 
the prior art, though not all in a single reference. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 1454 (defining 
“read on” as “to contain all the same features of (a prior-art reference)”). 
 71 See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 1000. 
 72 See id.  
 73 Timothy R. Holbrook, Obviousness in Patent Law and the Motivation to Combine: A Presumption-
Based Approach, WASH. U. L. REV., Slip Opinions, Mar. 21, 2007, at 4 & n.11 available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=976695 (citing questionable patents for a crustless peanut butter and jelly sandwich, 
U.S. Patent No 6,004,596 (filed Dec. 8, 1997), and a method of swinging on a swing, U.S. Patent No. 
6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000)). 
 74 See id. 
 75 Lunney & Johnson, supra note 12, at 65. 
 76 See Lori Andrews et al., When Patents Threaten Science, 314 SCIENCE 1395, 1395–96 (2006) (citing 
Lori Andrews, The Patent Office as Thought Police, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 17, 2006, at B20; Editorial, 
Patently Absurd, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2006, at A14, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB114117826666886050; Editorial, Patently Ridiculous, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2006, at A24, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/22/opinion/22wed1.html; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Biotech Patents: Looking 
Backward While Moving Forward, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 317 (2006)). 
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C. The Supreme Court Intervenes with KSR 
This evolution ultimately culminated in the Federal Circuit applying a 
particularly stringent version of the TSM test in Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR 
International Co., in which the court required some TSM “that would have led 
a [PHOSITA] to combine the relevant prior art teachings in the manner 
claimed.”77 Teleflex brought suit against KSR alleging infringement of its 
patent covering a vehicle pedal that could be adjusted via an electronic control. 
KSR countered by asserting that the patent was invalid because its claims were 
obvious.78 In granting summary judgment in favor of KSR, the district court 
determined that, because the limitations of the claim at issue could be found in 
a combination of prior art references, the claim was obvious.79 On appeal, the 
Federal Circuit issued a non-precedential opinion that stated the established 
standards for obviousness with particular reference to Section 103, Graham v. 
John Deere, and In re Dembiczak.80 The court reiterated that the legal question 
of obviousness is grounded in 35 U.S.C. § 103 and should be analyzed based 
on the underlying factual inquiries addressed by the Graham factors.81 After 
articulating the version of the TSM test noted above, the Federal Circuit 
conceded that evidence of obviousness may be rebutted by the fourth Graham 
factor of secondary considerations.82  
The Federal Circuit’s opinion made clear its skepticism when examiners or 
accused infringers combine references to reject or invalidate a patent claim as 
obvious: the court feared that the hindsight bias would affect the decisions of 
those viewing the patent at a later time.83 The Federal Circuit criticized the 
district court’s application of the TSM test as incomplete because it did not 
“make specific findings as to a suggestion or motivation to attach an electronic 
control to the support bracket of the [prior art pedal] assembly.”84 This type of 
specific finding would counteract the possibility of hindsight weighing too 
heavily in the court’s decision.85 The court found that the award of summary 
 
 77 119 F. App’x 282, 285 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). 
 78 See Thomas C. Goldstein, The KSR Backstory, LANDSLIDE, Sept.–Oct. 2008, at 23, 23.  
 79 Teleflex, 119 F. App’x at 284. 
 80 Id. at 285 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000)); see also Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 
1, 14 (1966); In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 998 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); Goldstein, supra note 78, at 23. 
 81 Teleflex, 119 F. App’x at 285. 
 82 Id.; see Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. 
 83 See Teleflex, 119 F. App’x at 285–86 (citing Federal Circuit case law in favor of the TSM test and 
asserting that there must be TSM to “combine the prior art teachings in the particular manner claimed” in order 
to guard against the hindsight bias). 
 84 Id. at 288. 
 85 See id. 
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judgment by the trial court was inappropriate because there were genuine 
issues of material fact regarding obviousness; therefore, the Federal Circuit 
vacated the decision of the district court and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.86 
After the Federal Circuit’s decision, KSR petitioned for a writ of certiorari. 
The petition struck a chord with the Supreme Court, arguably because it 
advanced the position that, because the Federal Circuit was “too pro-patent,” it 
was flouting one of the primary objectives of patent law: advancing 
innovation.87 By arguing that the Federal Circuit had “boldly repudiated” 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, KSR persuaded the Court to take the case.88 
In its opinion, the Supreme Court dismissed the Federal Circuit’s 
application of the TSM test as too strict and instead relied upon its own earlier 
jurisprudence to hold that a more flexible approach was required.89 To some 
extent, the Court shared the Federal Circuit’s hesitancy to grant patents for 
combinations of prior art, but the Court held that the framework established by 
its precedent and 35 U.S.C. § 103 were sufficient to guard against the issuance 
of patents on combinations of existing technology when those combinations 
“yield predictable results.”90 The Court noted that it will often be necessary for 
a court to consider the teachings of multiple patents; in such cases, “[t]o 
facilitate review, the analysis should be made explicit.”91 The Court conceded 
that the TSM test could be a helpful insight into whether a PHOSITA would 
have had a reason to combine the elements of the prior art in the same way as 
the claimed invention, but as a “rigid and mandatory formula,” it did not 
comport with Supreme Court precedent.92 
 
 86 Id. at 290. 
 87 See Goldstein, supra note 78, at 24 (“[KSR’s counsel] fundamentally redefined the issue in the case, 
and did so in a way that tapped into a much broader and deeper vein of criticism of patent jurisprudence: that 
the Federal Circuit is too pro-patent and is, as a consequence, stifling innovation.”). 
 88 Id. (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 16, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) 
(No. 04-1350), 2005 WL 835463). KSR had others on its side: amici curiae including technology companies, 
the Progress & Freedom Foundation, and academics; and the solicitor general, who requested the views of the 
PTO. See id. 
 89 KSR, 550 U.S. at 415. 
 90 See id. at 415–17. 
 91 Id. at 418 (discussing the proposition that “rejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by 
mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational 
underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness” (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 92 Id. at 418–19. 
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The primary flaw that the Supreme Court found with the TSM test was the 
Federal Circuit’s “narrow conception of the obviousness inquiry reflected in its 
application of the . . . test.”93 The Court found error with the Federal Circuit’s 
degree of concern with hindsight bias.94 The opinion introduced “common 
sense” as a path to proving obviousness since “[c]ommon sense teaches . . . 
that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes” and 
a PHOSITA may “be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like 
pieces of a puzzle.”95 Further, the Court emphasized that a PHOSITA might 
reasonably consider prior art originally designed to solve problems other than 
his or her own since the PHOSITA is “a person of ordinary creativity, not an 
automaton.”96 The PHOSITA would also recognize that a technique used to 
improve one device could be used to improve other similar devices, so the use 
of that technique may be considered obvious.97 
The Court also disagreed with the Federal Circuit’s rejection of the 
“obvious to try” standard and held that “[w]hen there is a design need or 
market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, 
predictable solutions” then “the fact that the combination was obvious to try 
might show that it was obvious under § 103.”98 The Court further noted that 
“simple substitution of one known element for another” is obvious, but 
activities beyond simple substitution may require a more in-depth analysis to 
determine obviousness.99 When all of these principles were applied to the facts 
at issue, the Supreme Court held that the claim was obvious.100 
II. PROSECUTION DIFFICULTIES FOLLOWING KSR 
This Part explains how obviousness determinations are made at the PTO 
and the changes that occurred in the MPEP following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in KSR. It then examines one of the currently available methods for 
combating obviousness rejections: the secondary considerations of Graham. 
Finally, this Part concludes by suggesting that the secondary considerations of 
 
 93 Id. at 419. 
 94 See id. at 420–21. 
 95 Id. at 420. 
 96 Id. at 421. 
 97 See id. at 417. 
 98 Id. at 421 (citation omitted). 
 99 Id. at 417. 
 100 Id. at 422. 
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Graham are an inadequate guard against hindsight bias, specifically in the 
context of patent prosecution. 
A. Patent Examination Process 
Before delving into the problems experienced in patent prosecution 
following KSR, it is important to understand a patent examiner’s qualifications 
and the process by which she examines patent applications. Examiners are not 
required to have legal training, but they must have obtained at least a 
bachelor’s degree in their respective field.101 When an application for patent is 
received at the PTO, it is assigned to a single patent examiner who will read 
the claims included in the application.102 Due to time constraints and 
examination quotas, the examiner may not thoroughly read the specification 
included in the application,103 especially if she believes she has grasped the 
technology by reading only the claims. 
At this point, the examiner will gather a primary group of references that 
she deems relevant to the technology at hand.104 Key word searching may 
bring in references that use similar or the same wording that appears in the 
claims but may be directed to a different subject matter. Pressure to reject 
claims upon first examination is high, especially for new examiners whose 
supervisors are weary of the suggestion that as-filed claims are allowable.105 In 
this context, even if the prior art appears to lack the disclosure of certain 
features of the claims, the examiner may be relegated to reading the claims 
broadly enough so that that the primary group of references reads on the 
claims. Assuming she does not find an anticipatory reference,106 the examiner 
 
 101 See Patent Examiner Positions, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ 
pac/exam.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2015); Patent Examiner (Computer Engineering), USAJOBS.GOV, 
https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/355133000 (last visited Mar. 4, 2015). 
 102 The “patent claim” defines the scope of the patent’s protection. The claims are typically found at the 
end of the patent document in a numbered list that describes the “novel features of [the] invention.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 1303–04. 
 103 The patent “specification” (or patent application) is a considerably longer part of the patent document 
that describes “how [the] invention is made and used.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 1616. 
The specification technically includes the inventor’s claims, see id., but this Comment adopts the convention 
within the practice of patent law by referring to the claims and the specification separately. 
 104 See MPEP, supra note 44, § 700. 
 105 It is a common thought among patent attorneys that any claim not initially rejected was probably 
drafted too narrowly. It is not uncommon for over 75% of applications that eventually issue as patents to be 
initially rejected. See Dennis Crouch, Percentage of Patents that were Initially Rejected, PATENTLYO (Apr. 3, 
2009), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/04/percentage-of-patents-that-were-initially-rejected.html. 
 106 An anticipatory reference would include every element of the claim at hand, so the claim would no 
longer meet the novelty requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
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will be required to undertake the secondary exercise of finding ways that the 
pool of primary references could be combined to teach every element of the 
claims. The examiner should pause at this point in the process to consider 
whether her chosen references make sense when put together; she should also 
consider whether combining those references is something a PHOSITA would 
have reasonably considered. In the rejection she issues, the examiner should 
explain her reasoning as to why the particular references combine to read on 
the applicant’s claims, as required by KSR.107 
Often, though, this process does not happen as it should. Examiners may be 
faced with supervisory pressure, time constraints, or inadequate appreciation of 
the legal issues at hand, and may make these combinations without giving due 
consideration to whether the reasoning for the combination is sound. 
Misguided rejections have become more common since the Supreme Court’s 
decision in KSR opened the door to impermissible hindsight by removing the 
pause required by the TSM test during examination. 
B. Changes in the MPEP Post-KSR 
In rejecting the Federal Circuit’s requirement of TSM to combine 
references, the KSR decision highlighted various rationales for obviousness 
rejections to patent examiners. Following KSR, some scholars and practitioners 
have expressed concern that nonobvious patents are being summarily rejected 
on the basis of the highlighted rationales: providing “predictable result[s],” 
being “obvious to try,” and being “common sense,” among others.108 When the 
PTO revised the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) in view of 
the KSR decision, it added a number of “[e]xemplary rationales that may 
support a conclusion of obviousness” based on the Court’s opinion.109 The 
MPEP currently states: 
(A) Combining prior art elements according to known methods to 
yield predictable results; 
 
 107 See KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). 
 108 See Jeffrey K. Mills, Jason A. Fitzsimmons & Kevin Rodkey, Protecting Nanotechnology Inventions: 
Prosecuting in an Unpredictable World, 7 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 223, 226 (2010); Marian Underweiser, 
Presumed Obvious: How KSR Redefines the Obviousness Inquiry to Help Improve the Public Record of a 
Patent, 50 IDEA 247, 268–70 (2010) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 415–16, 420–21). But cf. Tom Brody, 
Obviousness in Patents Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision, KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 
92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 26, 29–30 (2010) (arguing that the KSR decision has not necessarily 
resulted in an increase in obvious rejections). 
 109 Compare MPEP, § 2143 (8th ed. Rev. 5, Aug. 2006) (lacking examples), with MPEP, § 2143 (8th ed. 
Rev. 6, Sept. 2007) (providing examples). 
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(B) Simple substitution of one known element for another to obtain 
predictable results; 
(C) Use of known technique to improve similar devices (methods, or 
products) in the same way; 
(D) Applying a known technique to a known device (method, or 
product) ready for improvement to yield predictable results; 
(E) “Obvious to try” – choosing from a finite number of identified, 
predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success; 
(F) Known work in one field of endeavor may prompt variations of it 
for use in either the same field or a different one based on design 
incentives or other market forces if the variations are predictable to 
one of ordinary skill in the art; 
(G) Some teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art that 
would have led one of ordinary skill to modify the prior art reference 
or to combine prior art reference teachings to arrive at the claimed 
invention.110 
Examiners can use these rationales to combine references under KSR. In short, 
“KSR increased the range of arguments available for asserting the obviousness 
of an invention,”111 thus making patent applications easier to reject without a 
thoughtful, well-reasoned explanation as to why the claimed invention is 
obvious.112 
Prior to KSR, though the Federal Circuit suggested it was permissible to 
rely upon an implicit teaching, suggestion, or motivation, most of its cases 
seemed to apply a rigid rule that required an explicit teaching, suggestion, or 
motivation within the references themselves.113 This supplied patent applicants 
with a standby strategy to combat obviousness rejections: if applicable, assert a 
lack of explicit TSM to combine in the cited references themselves. But in 
light of the new exemplary rationales to support obviousness rejections, and 
without the requirement for TSM to combine, patent applicants after KSR have 
been left with little to combat potential hindsight bias implicated in 
obviousness rejections other than the KSR requirement for explicit analysis in 
the rejection114 and the secondary considerations of Graham.115 
 
 110 See MPEP, supra note 44, § 2143. 
 111 Mills, supra note 108, at 228 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 413–419). 
 112 See id. 
 113 In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987–88 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 114 See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. 
 115 See Post-KSR Patent Prosecution “Survival Guide,” CROWELL MORING (May 16, 2007), 
http://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/AlertsNewsletters/IP-Insights/Post-KSR-Patent-Prosecution-Survival-
Guide/pdf (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)). 
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C. Development of the Secondary Considerations of Graham 
Legal scholars have proposed, and courts have adopted, various secondary 
considerations to consider in the fourth Graham factor. These so-called 
“objective indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness” are usually 
“non-technical [factors] . . . which focus the [S]ection 103 inquiry on economic 
and motivational issues surrounding the development of the claimed 
invention.”116 The Graham decision itself contemplated “commercial success, 
[fulfillment of] long felt but unsolved needs, [or] failure of others” as potential 
secondary considerations.117 Other examples include “unexpected results,”118 
“licensing to potential competitors, copying by an infringer, progress of the 
patent application through the [PTO], near-simultaneous invention by another 
researcher in the field, and professional approval by experts in the field.”119 
In the context of litigation, secondary considerations can work well as one 
factor in the Graham test for obviousness because they “substantially 
simplif[y] the obviousness inquiry” by their “non-technical” nature.120 Because 
they “[gave] insight into the circumstances surrounding the development of the 
claimed invention,” these considerations also “reduce[] the danger that the 
obviousness evaluation would be based on hindsight, or that the inventor’s 
discovery would inadvertently be read into the prior art.”121 Since any 
litigation necessarily takes place after the patent has issued, there is a greater 
likelihood that the patented technology has the potential to have been 
commercially exploited, and therefore many of the secondary considerations 
can be proven if they exist.122 
 
 116 Dorothy Whelan, Note, A Critique of the Use of Secondary Considerations in Applying the Section 103 
Nonobviousness Test for Patentability, 28 B.C. L. REV. 357, 365 (1987) (citing Graham, 383 U.S. at 36 and 
Richard L. Robbins, Note, Subtests of “Nonobviousness”: A Nontechnical Approach to Patent Validity, 
112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 1171–72 (1964)). 
 117 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. 
 118 Andrew Blair-Stanek, Increased Market Power as a New Secondary Consideration in Patent Law, 58 
AM. U. L. REV. 707, 712–13 (2009) (listing nine secondary considerations developed by courts). 
 119 Whelan, supra note 116, at 366. 
 120 Id. (citing Graham, 383 U.S. at 36 and Robbins, supra note 116). 
 121 Id. at 367. 
 122 See generally Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 
1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding secondary considerations sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of 
obviousness). 
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D. Inadequacy or Impracticality of Secondary Considerations in Patent 
Prosecution 
Although secondary considerations may be an adequate guard against 
hindsight in litigation, they are often less helpful in the context of patent 
prosecution for several reasons. First, objective indicia of nonobviousness such 
as commercial success or commercial acquiescence via licensing may not be 
available at the prosecution stage since applicants may wait until the patent is 
granted to commercialize or seek licensees. Second, evidence of copying by 
competitors is not applicable in prosecution, particularly if the application has 
not yet published; presumably, competitors have nothing to copy since the 
technology may have been kept secret prior to patenting. Third, progress of the 
patent application through the PTO cannot be considered during the 
application process. The other secondary considerations, though perhaps more 
applicable than their counterparts at the prosecution stage, still may not be 
available without the benefit of an adversary and the opportunity for discovery. 
Fourth, the MPEP requires a nexus between the evidence of secondary 
considerations provided and the claimed invention.123 For example, the 
applicant must be able to prove that the reason for commercial success is the 
claimed invention itself and not a clever marketing campaign.124 Though the 
nexus requirement is admittedly necessary, it may be exceedingly difficult to 
prove to the examiner.125 Finally, some attorneys report that arguing secondary 
considerations in a response before the PTO “typically falls on deaf ears” since 
examiners often view evidence of secondary considerations as something to be 
weighed only when the obviousness inquiry is a “close call.”126 
Prosecuting attorneys are often left to argue technical distinctions between 
the claims and the prior art to combat rejections for obviousness. Due to the 
unavailability or impracticality in prosecution of secondary considerations for 
guarding against hindsight bias, a vacuum remains that invites a new test to 
fairly and adequately assess whether an examiner has used impermissible 
hindsight to combine references in a rejection based upon obviousness. 
 
 123 See MPEP, supra note 44, § 716.01(b). 
 124 See id. 
 125 See id. 
 126 Secondary Considerations, FISH IP LAW, http://www.fishiplaw.com/~fishipla/chapter11a.html (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2015). 
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III. FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING USE OF IMPERMISSIBLE HINDSIGHT 
This Part proposes a framework for determining whether an obviousness 
rejection is based on an impermissible level of hindsight bias. It proposes 
considering ten factors in the totality of the circumstances to gauge whether the 
degree of hindsight employed by the examiner to reject claims as obvious 
under Section 103 was permissible.127 The factors are principally inspired by 
indicia that courts have historically considered relevant when determining 
obviousness. The provided framework is intended as a check on the patent 
examination process described in Part II.128 The examiner may generate a 
rejection based on one of the exemplary rationales set forth in the MPEP, but 
this framework gives a legal basis for argument to applicants who believe the 
rejection is impermissibly based upon hindsight. A proper obviousness 
rejection is based on a “fact-intensive comparison of the claimed process with 
the prior art rather than the mechanical application of one or another per se 
rule.”129 This Comment recognizes that every patent examination is necessarily 
subject to some degree of hindsight,130 but the goal of this framework is to 
determine whether an examiner has crossed the line between permissible 
unavoidable hindsight and the bias of impermissible hindsight. The intent of 
the proposed framework is to focus on whether the examiner was fair in the 
process of considering the obviousness of the application at hand. 
Each of the sections below proposes considering a factor that may indicate 
whether an examiner has relied on impermissible hindsight. The factors listed 
here are not an all-inclusive list, as there are likely many others that could 
reasonably bear on the question of hindsight. The factors have their basis in 
existing case law, and many have been considered important to the overall 
question of obviousness. This Part proceeds in ten sections, which will address 
each of this Comment’s proposed factors in turn: (1) the degree to which the 
combined references show or suggest all elements of the claim being 
examined; (2) the degree to which the rejection is based on a clearly 
articulated, reasonable rationale to combine references; (3) the degree to which 
the results are predictable; (4) the degree to which the combined references are 
compatible; (5) the degree to which the examiner has analyzed each of the 
 
 127 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 128 See supra Part II.A. 
 129 Austen Zuege & Carolyn Beck, No Short-Cuts: Weighing the Facts Under §103, 91 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 398, 402 (2009) (quoting In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 130 See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1971). 
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references as a whole rather than picking and choosing key phrases; (6) the 
degree to which combining the references would change the principle of 
operation of the primary reference; (7) the degree to which one or more of the 
references teach away from the combination made by the applicant; (8) the 
degree to which the cited references are analogous art to the application; 
(9) the number of references combined for the rejection; and (10) the degree to 
which the examiner cites to inapplicable case law. 
A. Degree to Which References Show or Suggest All Elements of the Claim 
The first factor to be considered is the degree to which the references relied 
upon in the rejection actually show or suggest all elements of the claim at 
issue. The case law and the MPEP require that all claim limitations be 
considered when judging the obviousness of that claim.131 Examiners 
sometimes fail to “explain where or how [the] cited art [teaches] or suggest[s] 
all of the features of a claimed invention.”132 Given the process of patent 
examination explained in Part II,133 it is easy to see how this oversight might 
occur: once the pool of references has been gathered, the examiner may be 
tempted to stretch the contents of the prior art in the pool to make her 
rejections. However, the law still requires “an examiner [to] make ‘a searching 
comparison of the claimed invention—including all its limitations—with the 
teaching of the prior art.’”134 
It is well established that the prior art must usually disclose every limitation 
of a given claim under consideration, but perhaps this requirement is part of a 
larger guard against hindsight.135 Given the examination process discussed in 
Part II,136 it seems reasonable to infer that an examiner might be tempted to 
 
 131 See In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (C.C.P.A. 1970); MPEP, supra note 44, § 2143.03. 
 132 Michael E. Kondoudis, How to Respond to § 103 Rejections Using the “All Elements Test” in View of 
Recent Revisions to Section 2143.03 of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure – Part II, 
PATENTABLYDEFINED (May 27, 2008), http://patentablydefined.com/2008/05/27/how-to-respond-to-
%C2%A7-103-obviousness-rejections-using-the-%E2%80%9Call-elements-test%E2%80%9D-in-view-of-
recent-revisions-to-section-214303-of-the-manual-of-patent-examining-procedure-part-ii/. 
 133 See supra Part II.A. 
 134 Ex parte Wada, No. 2007-3733, 2008 WL 142652, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 14, 2008) (quoting In re Ochiai, 
71 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); see also In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (requiring 
that the prior art “disclose, suggest, or render obvious the claimed invention, either individually or when 
combined”). 
 135 Ex parte Wada, 2008 WL 142652, at *4. Admittedly, there are exceptions to this rule; in particular, 
when a concept is so well-known that it need not be memorialized in prior art then it may not be necessary for 
the prior art to disclose that limitation. See MPEP, supra note 44, § 2144.03. 
 136 See supra Part II.A. 
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stretch the contents of the prior art to make a rejection. If the claim element 
clearly defines “X,” and the references describe the similar but distinct concept 
of “Y,” there is a high degree of separation between the claim element and the 
references. If the examiner reads the claim element X into a reference that 
clearly states Y, it stands to reason that the examiner may have used hindsight 
to bridge the gap: the claimed invention is providing a roadmap that the 
element would have fit into the prior art. This is an exercise in impermissible 
hindsight analysis. Thus the extent to which the claim discloses certain 
elements that are not shown or suggested in the references is probative of the 
extent to which an examiner has relied upon impermissible hindsight to reject 
the claim as obvious. 
B. Degree to Which the Rationale to Combine is Reasonable 
The second factor to consider is the degree to which a rejection states a 
reasonable rationale to combine the references. In KSR, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the standard that the analysis made by the examiner should be 
explicit and that “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning 
[is required] to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”137 Thus, if the 
examiner thoroughly explains her reasoning for combining the references in a 
way that could reasonably make sense to a PHOSITA, then the examiner has 
met her procedural burden and may have made a proper rejection.138 However, 
if the reasoning is not clearly presented in a sensible manner, or if the 
reasoning is merely conclusory, this suggests the use of impermissible 
hindsight in the selection and combination of the references.139 If the 
combination cannot be explained, it seems likely that, in truth, the combination 
was derived using the applicant’s specification as a roadmap.140 For example, 
the use of the applicant’s teaching to explain the combination of prior art 
references would be an obvious exercise in impermissible hindsight. The 
extent to which a rejection fails to state a reasonable rationale, or any rationale 
at all, to combine references may indicate the extent to which an examiner has 
relied upon impermissible hindsight to reject the claim as obvious.141 
 
 137 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 138 See id. 
 139 See id. 
 140 See id. 
 141 See id. 
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C. Degree to Which Results Are Predictable 
The predictability of the benefits and results of the technology is probative 
when determining whether an examiner has relied upon impermissible 
hindsight to combine references. Predictability has long been considered142 
when making obviousness determinations. An examiner might best determine 
whether an inventor’s solution is considered predictable by pausing to consider 
whether a PHOSITA would have had a “reasonable expectation of success” in 
combining the teachings of the prior art.143 To be obvious, “absolute 
predictability of success” is not required, since “[t]here is always at least a 
possibility” that unexpected results could arise from the combination.144 
Further, as a general rule, more complex technologies are less likely to be 
predictable—patents for pharmaceutical compounds, for example, are 
“notorious[ly]” unpredictable.145 In these types of complex technological 
fields, there are many parameters that might be varied. When the prior art 
provides little guidance as to which parameters might be most likely to 
successfully create the combination, the results are likely to be unpredictable 
and therefore nonobvious.146 Though “unexpected results” are often analyzed 
as one of the secondary considerations contemplated by Graham,147 the 
presence of unexpected results may also imply that the combinations of 
references made to reject claims were generated with the use of impermissible 
hindsight. Rejecting claims and combining references without a full 
appreciation that the invention would not predictably flow from the 
combination points toward the use of impermissible hindsight. 
When an examiner combines references to form an obviousness rejection in 
a technological field with little predictability, that combination may be subject 
to some degree of impermissible hindsight. In unpredictable fields, a 
PHOSITA would have less expectation of success when combining elements 
known independently in the prior art. Stated differently, a PHOSITA would be 
more likely to experience unexpected results in an unpredictable field. The 
result of a simple substitution of one screw for a different type of screw is 
 
 142 See In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 143 See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 681, 692 (2010) (citing Life Techs., Inc. v. Clontech 
Labs., Inc., 224 F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 144 In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d at 903.  
 145 See In re Kamal, 398 F.2d 867, 871 (C.C.P.A. 1968); see also Sean B. Seymore, Heightened 
Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 137–38 (2008). 
 146 See PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 147 See, e.g., Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 662–63 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Graham v. John 
Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)). 
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likely to be predictable and therefore obvious. However, in the context of other 
fields, the inventor may not have a similar expectation of success. It might 
even seem obvious in hindsight that a given combination or substitution could 
successfully be made, but it is likely the case that, at the time of filing, 
conventional wisdom could not have predicted that success. The extent to 
which the results or benefits of an invention are unpredictable is probative of 
the extent to which an examiner has relied upon impermissible hindsight to 
reject the claim as obvious. 
D. Degree of Compatibility Among Cited References 
Another factor to consider is the degree to which the references cited in the 
rejection are compatible with each other. The compatibility of the references 
has long been considered important to the overall question of obviousness148 
but also bears specifically on whether a rejection of claims for obviousness in a 
patent application is the product of impermissible hindsight. For example, in In 
re Whiton, a case concerning polymers used in “extruded and molded plastic 
articles,” the inventor “plasticiz[ed]” the polymer with a specific type of 
polyester to make it more flexible than its previously rigid state.149 The 
examiner rejected the inventor’s claims based on several prior art references.150 
Two references disclosed a polymer similar to the one claimed that could be 
mixed with ingredients such as plasticizers to achieve flexibility.151 However, 
these references did not mention “any specific plasticizers suitable for use” 
with the polymers, so the examiner consulted other references for their 
disclosure of the inventor’s type of polyester used with a different type of 
polymer.152 The court concluded that no evidence existed to suggest that a 
PHOSITA would recognize that the polyester plasticizer used with one type of 
polymer would be compatible with the other type of polymer.153 Because there 
was no evidence that the teachings of the references were compatible, the 
rejection based on those references was overturned and the invention was held 
to be nonobvious.154  
 
 148 See generally In re Whiton, 420 F.2d 1082 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (addressing the issue of obviousness in 
light of the compatibility of references particular to the patent in question). 
 149 Id. at 1082–83 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 150 See id. at 1083. 
 151 See id. 
 152 See id. at 1084. 
 153 See id. at 1085. 
 154 See id. at 1085–86. 
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In cases like this one, it seems likely that the examiner focused upon 
finding claim elements in the prior art and lost sight of what a PHOSITA 
would have considered during the inventive process. In essence, such an 
examiner might have focused on finding elements of claims in references 
without pausing to consider how a PHOSITA would perceive the 
incompatibility of the references. If a PHOSITA viewed the teachings of the 
prior art as incompatible, she would be unlikely to combine them. The 
examiner, however, has the benefit of the claims to assist in finding each 
element of the invention, regardless of the compatibility of the references. 
Thus the extent to which a rejection relies upon references that are 
incompatible with each other is probative of the extent to which an examiner 
has relied upon impermissible hindsight to reject the claim as obvious. 
E. Degree of Analysis of the Reference as a Whole 
Another factor to consider is the degree to which the examiner has analyzed 
each reference as a whole; this analysis should also consider whether the 
examiner has considered the claimed invention as a whole. Case law has long 
stated, “The relevant portions of a reference include not only those teachings 
which would suggest particular aspects of an invention to one having ordinary 
skill in the art, but also those teachings which would lead such a person away 
from the claimed invention.”155 This statement implies that the reference 
should be considered in its entirety in the determination of obviousness, not 
just the portions that seem to support the idea of the combination the examiner 
wants to make. An examiner’s reliance on “isolated teachings of the prior art 
without considering the over-all context within which those teachings are 
presented” is improper and should be considered when determining the use of 
impermissible hindsight.156 The obviousness inquiry should not be focused on 
the “obviousness of substitutions and differences” but rather on the 
obviousness of the “invention as a whole.”157 
Choosing bits and pieces of the prior art that favor the combination the 
examiner wants to make, and failing to consider each reference as a whole, 
may indicate that the examiner has relied upon impermissible hindsight to 
make that combination. When researching a particular field of invention to 
inspire the next steps in the inventive process, the applicant would be faced 
 
 155 In re Mercier, 515 F.2d 1161, 1166 (C.C.P.A. 1975).  
 156 Id.  
 157 Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing Hodosh v. 
Block Drug Co., 786 F.2d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
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with the references as a whole instead of with key words or phrases that match 
the wording of her invention. Without the benefit of her not-yet-written claims 
guiding the search process, the applicant would not know which portions of the 
reference she should consider relevant and which portions might be overlooked 
during examination.158 The examiner has the benefit of the claims before her. 
To use the claims to piece together information that a PHOSITA would not 
have combined when faced with the references as a whole is an exercise in 
impermissible hindsight reconstruction. Thus, the extent to which an examiner 
chooses bits and pieces of the prior art, and in doing so fails to consider the 
references as a whole, is probative of the extent to which an examiner has 
relied upon impermissible hindsight to reject the claim as obvious. 
F. Degree to Which Combination Changes the Principle of Operation 
Another factor that should be considered is the degree to which the 
proposed modification or combination of the prior art would change the 
principle of the operation of the prior art. Such a concept has long been 
considered relevant to patentability. For example, the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals found in In re Ratti that a particular combination of references 
did not constitute proper grounds for an obviousness rejection since the 
combination “would require a substantial reconstruction and redesign” of the 
prior art as well as a change in its principles of operation.159 Though the Board 
of Patent Appeals and Interferences viewed Ratti as “non-controlling in law” 
following KSR, it also implied that a change in the principle of operation may 
be persuasive in fact, even if not in law.160 
A combination of references that would render a prior art technology 
unsatisfactory for its intended purpose seems to persuasively point toward the 
use of hindsight, even if such a finding is not controlling in law. When an 
examiner combines references without giving due consideration to whether the 
proposed combination would change the principle of operation of the primary 
reference, the building of the combination is more likely to be an exercise in 
impermissible hindsight. Again, the presence of key terms within multiple 
references may have supplanted real thought and reasoning as to why the 
 
 158 In re Mercier, 515 F.2d at 1166. 
 159 See In re Ratti, 270 F.2d 810, 813 (C.C.P.A. 1959). Of course, if the prior art would still operate 
according to the same principles, even once combined with elements of other references, then Ratti is 
inapplicable. In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing In re Umbarger, 407 F.2d 425, 430–
31 (C.C.P.A. 1969)). 
 160 See Ex parte Purcell & Benedict, No. 2008-004765, 2009 WL 1717401, at *5 (B.P.A.I. June 3, 2009). 
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combination would have reasonably been made by a PHOSITA. In this respect, 
the examiner may have ignored or may not have been cognizant of the fact that 
her combination required a change in the prior art that rendered it unsuitable 
for its intended purpose. The extent to which an examiner’s rejection relies 
upon a combination of references that would change the principle of operation 
of the prior art may indicate the extent to which an examiner has relied upon 
impermissible hindsight to reject the claim as obvious. 
G. Degree to Which References Teach Away from the Applicant’s 
Combination 
Another factor that should be considered is the degree to which the 
references cited in the obviousness rejection actually discourage the 
combination made in the claimed invention. To establish a prima facie case of 
obviousness, the examiner must offer some “articulated reasoning with some 
rational underpinning” to combine the teachings of prior art references.161 This 
combination may not be rationally made if one of the prior art references 
“teaches away from its combination with another source.”162 A reference 
teaches away from the combination if 
a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be 
discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or 
would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by 
the applicant . . . [or] if it suggests that the line of development 
flowing from the reference’s disclosure is unlikely to be productive 
of the result sought by the applicant.163  
The Federal Circuit has also held that if the combination of two references 
“‘would produce a seemingly inoperative device,’ then they teach away from 
their combination.”164 
By way of example, the Federal Circuit found this notion of teaching away 
in a case involving a “blood filter assembly” to remove clots and other items 
from a patient’s blood before it was returned to the patient’s body.165 The prior 
art cited against the claimed invention was a “liquid strainer for removing dirt 
 
 161 In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 
(2007). 
 162 Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Mfg. Mich. Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 163 See id. at 1360 (alterations in original) (quoting In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
 164 Id. (quoting In re Sponnoble, 405 F.2d 578, 587 (C.C.P.A. 1969)). 
 165 See In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 900–02 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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and water from gasoline.”166 The primary difference between the claimed 
invention and the prior art was the position of the inlet and outlet openings at 
the top or bottom of the device.167 The court found that if the prior art strainer 
was “turned upside down” to look like the claimed invention, as suggested by 
the PTO Board of Appeals, “it would be rendered inoperable for its intended 
purpose.”168 This inoperability led the Federal Circuit to conclude that the prior 
art taught away from the Board’s proposed modification.169 This idea of 
teaching away was also found when the relevant references regarding “[t]ape 
of unsintered polytetrafluorethylene (PTFE)[,] (known by the trademark 
TEFLON of E.I. du Pont de Nemours, Inc.),”170 suggested that, to avoid 
breakage, Teflon should be slowly stretched to the desired length.171 The 
inventor disregarded this conventional wisdom by stretching the Teflon as 
quickly as possible and found that this technique allowed him to stretch it to 
lengths he was previously unable to achieve.172 Because the prior art taught 
away from the method undertaken by the inventor, the inventor’s method was 
not obvious.173 
If the cited references would discourage a PHOSITA from making the 
combination of references to arrive at the invention claimed in the patent, but 
the examiner relies upon them for an obviousness rejection, that rejection 
implicates some degree of impermissible hindsight. It seems likely that the 
examiner ignored the full teaching of the reference, did not understand the full 
teaching of the reference, or did not read the reference at all. Only in hindsight 
would it be obvious to make a combination that the conventional wisdom 
warns against making or suggests is likely to be unsuccessful. The extent to 
which an examiner relies on references that teach away from the combination 
of the claimed invention may indicate the extent to which the examiner has 
relied upon impermissible hindsight to choose or combine the reference or 
references. The same is true when the rejection relies upon a combination of 
references that would render the prior art inoperable for its intended purpose, 
 
 166 See id. at 901. 
 167 See id. at 901–02. 
 168 Id. at 902. 
 169 See id. 
 170 W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1544–45 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 171 See id. at 1545. 
 172 See id. 
 173 See id. at 1552–53. 
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like the blood filter assembly above, and therefore implicitly teaches away 
from the combination.174 
H. Degree to Which References Are Analogous to the Application 
Another factor that should be considered is the degree to which the 
references cited in the rejection are analogous to the art in the application. The 
concept of analogous art developed as courts and examiners attempted to 
define what a PHOSITA would have reasonably consulted in seeking a 
solution to the problem addressed by his or her invention. Not surprisingly 
then, “References . . . qualify as prior art for an obviousness determination 
only when analogous to the claimed invention.”175 A reference is considered 
analogous art if “(1) . . . the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless 
of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the 
inventor’s endeavor, . . . [it] is still reasonably pertinent to the particular 
problem with which the inventor is involved.”176 The analogous art test 
presumes that the inventor has full knowledge of all of the prior art in her field 
of endeavor and also “presume[s] knowledge [of] those arts reasonably 
pertinent to the particular problem” that the inventor was trying to solve.177 
The test recognizes, however, that it would be impossible for an inventor to be 
aware of “every teaching in every art,” so it attempts to “approximate the 
reality of the circumstances surrounding the making of an invention.”178 
Under the first prong of the test for analogous art, the examiner must 
“determine the appropriate field of endeavor by reference to explanations of 
the invention’s subject matter in the patent application, including the 
embodiments, function, and structure of the claimed invention.”179 Courts have 
previously confined the field of endeavor to the scope articulated in the 
background section of the patent application180 and have also allowed the use 
 
 174 See In re Gordon, 733 F.2d at 900–02. 
 175 In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 
1992)). 
 176 Id. (citing In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 177 In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (citing In re Antle, 444 F.2d 1168, 1171–72 
(C.C.P.A. 1971)). 
 178 Id. 
 179 In re Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325. 
 180 See id. at 1325–26. 
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of references “hav[ing] essentially the same function and structure” as the 
invention.181 
Under the second prong of the analogous test, “[a] reference is reasonably 
pertinent if, even though it may be in a different field from that of the 
inventor’s endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, 
logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in 
considering [her] problem.”182 This second prong was reinforced in KSR when 
the Court noted that “familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their 
primary purposes.”183 By way of example, the Federal Circuit has found that 
an inventor considering a “hinge and latch mechanism for portable computers” 
could reasonably be expected to consider other types of hinges and latches 
such as “a desktop telephone directory, a piano lid, a kitchen cabinet, a 
washing machine cabinet, a wooden furniture cabinet, [and] a two-part housing 
for storing audio cassettes” even though these examples did not squarely fit 
within the inventor’s field of endeavor.184 
The analogous art test exists as a basis to argue that prior art does not 
apply, but if non-analogous art is cited by examiners, that citation may bear 
specifically on whether the examiner has relied upon impermissible hindsight 
to choose or combine the reference or references. If an examiner manages to 
cite non-analogous prior art, she did so without giving due consideration to 
whether the reference falls within the same field of endeavor as the invention 
or whether it is reasonably pertinent to the problem the inventor faced. For 
example, a citation to non-analogous art may occur because an examiner has 
performed a keyword search of the prior art and found a phrase within the 
reference that seems similar enough to the claimed invention. This method of 
choosing a piece of prior art, or choosing to combine more than one piece of 
prior art, does not give due consideration to whether a PHOSITA would have 
reasonably consulted that particular reference and applied its teaching in 
seeking a solution to the problem addressed by his or her invention. It follows 
that impermissible hindsight is the primary vehicle utilized to conclude that it 
would have been obvious to a PHOSITA to include the limitation presented by 
 
 181 Id. at 1326 (quoting In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 182 In re Icon Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Clay, 966 
F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 183 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007). 
 184 In re Icon, 496 F.3d at 1380 (quoting In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1481–82 (Fed. Cir. 1994)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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the non-analogous reference in the claimed invention based on the similarity of 
terminology. Thus considering the extent to which an examiner cites 
non-analogous art may, as part of the framework as a whole, indicate the extent 
to which an examiner has relied upon impermissible hindsight to reject the 
claim as obvious. 
I. Number of References Combined 
The number of references combined to make an obviousness rejection may 
indicate whether the examiner has relied upon impermissible hindsight and 
should be considered as one factor in this proposed test. It is clear that the 
examiner may permissibly combine references for a rejection based on 
obviousness as long as she complies with other standards set forth in the MPEP 
and 35 U.S.C. § 103.185 No rule exists that explicitly states the maximum 
number of references she may permissibly combine.186 In fact, courts have held 
that the number of references combined to form a rejection is not a dispositive 
factor in determining obviousness.187 In one case, a combination of about 
twenty references was not enough to show obviousness when the references 
“‘skirt[ed] all around’ the claimed invention.”188 In another, the Federal Circuit 
clearly stated that the deciding principle of obviousness “is not the number of 
references, but what they would have meant to a person of ordinary skill in the 
field of the invention.”189 
Though it seems clear that the number of references combined to form a 
rejection is not a dispositive indicator of nonobviousness,190 it should be 
considered as one factor in a flexible framework to determine the use of 
impermissible hindsight by the examiner. It makes sense that a greater number 
of references combined would suggest a higher degree of hindsight bias 
because it suggests that the examiner is stretching to find all of the elements of 
the claimed invention. The probability increases that the references are 
included as showing or suggesting particular elements of the claimed invention 
without due consideration for whether a PHOSITA would combine those 
 
 185 See generally MPEP, supra note 44, § 2141 (treating combinations as common practice). 
 186 See MPEP, supra note 44, § 2145. 
 187 See id. at § 2145(V); see, e.g., In re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Hybritech, Inc. v. 
Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Kan. Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 
1149 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Troiel, 274 F.2d 944, 947 (C.C.P.A. 1960); In re Streckert, 167 F.2d 1010, 1011 
(C.C.P.A. 1948); In re Miller, 159 F.2d 756, 758–59 (C.C.P.A. 1947). 
 188 In re Gorman, 933 F.2d at 986 (alteration in original) (quoting Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1383). 
 189 Id. 
 190 See id. 
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references. As described in Part II,191 if the examiner cannot make a 
combination of references with relative ease that contains every element of the 
invention and would seem reasonable to a PHOSITA, then she is faced with 
either allowing the claim or, more likely, finding another way to reject it. At 
this point, the examiner will probably look to the application’s claims to find 
which elements are missing from her established pool of references and will 
begin to search again for those elements. While it is possible that she will find 
a legitimate reference in this second round of searching, it is also possible that 
she is using the claim as a template to pick and choose pieces of many different 
references, which is an exercise in hindsight. When the examiner must 
combine many different references in order to substantiate the rejection, it 
becomes less likely that a PHOSITA would have reasonably looked to that 
number of sources to solve the problem she faced. This suggests the use of an 
impermissible degree of hindsight. The extent to which an examiner cites to a 
greater number of references is probative of the extent to which the examiner 
has relied upon impermissible hindsight to reject the claim as obvious. 
J. Degree to Which Rejection Cites Inapplicable Case Law 
The final factor that should be considered is the degree to which a rejection 
for obviousness cites to case law and, if so, the degree to which that case law is 
applicable to the facts at issue and applied appropriately. Though the 
examiner’s task is often extremely difficult, this oversight occurs more often 
than it should, probably due in part to the lack of legal training the examiners 
have received.192 Section 2144.04 of the MPEP provides patent examiners with 
cases meant to serve as guidance to navigate common arguments made for and 
against obviousness during patent prosecution.193 These cases are included as 
examples to be considered in light of their facts and limitations.194 Problems 
arise, though, when “examiners sometimes apply [the MPEP examples] 
without having read the actual cases and therefore without a full understanding 
of the context and limitations of the legal holdings announced in those 
cases.”195 Some authors have compared the process to the popular children’s 
game of “telephone,” in which a message becomes distorted while being 
passed through several intermediary sources between the originator and the 
 
 191 See supra Part II.A. 
 192 See supra Part II.A. 
 193 See Zuege & Beck, supra note 129, at 402; see also MPEP, supra note 44, § 2144.04. 
 194 See Zuege & Beck, supra note 129, at 402. 
 195 Id. 
BOLT GALLEYSPROOFS2 3/19/2015 9:47 AM 
2015] COMBATING HINDSIGHT RECONSTRUCTION 1169 
final recipient.196 “By the time the cases from [the] MPEP . . . are cited against 
claims in patent applications, they are sometimes applied as sweeping per se 
pronouncements that find no support in the underlying cases and threaten to 
render all inventions unpatentable.”197 The temptation to rely upon the MPEP 
without fully considering the reach of the cases it cites is understandable, 
especially given the examiner’s “difficult task in having to understand and 
analyze a broad range of technologies based only on the text of patent 
applications before them, which are not always easy to read or put in 
context.”198 The standard remains, though, that the examiner must apply the 
law to the facts of the particular application before the PTO.199 Per se rules 
which eliminate “the need for fact-specific analysis of claims and prior art may 
be administratively convenient for [US]PTO examiners and the Board [of 
Patent Appeals & Interferences]. Indeed, they have been sanctioned by the 
Board as well. But reliance on per se rules of obviousness is legally incorrect 
and must cease.”200 
The extent to which an examiner relies on sweeping pronouncements from 
inapplicable case law may indicate the extent to which the examiner has relied 
upon impermissible hindsight to make the obviousness rejection. If an 
examiner relies upon a case, most likely one found in the MPEP, to reject a 
claim without properly examining the facts of the case in comparison with the 
application at issue, the examiner has not satisfied the procedural requirements 
of patent examination. The temptation to cite inapplicable case law might be 
especially great when, in light of the application before the PTO, the invention 
seems obvious to the examiner; in that case, citing to a case blurb included in 
the MPEP may serve as a convenient way to fill in the gaps between the facts 
of the application and what is taught by the references. This reliance may be an 
exercise in hindsight, and a greater number of citations to inapplicable case law 
may indicate a higher degree of hindsight. Thus, considering the degree to 
which an examiner cites inapplicable law would reduce the potential of the 
rejection being based on hindsight. 
 
 196 See id. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. at 401. 
 199 See id. at 402. 
 200 Id. at 402–03 (alterations in original) (quoting In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
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IV. POTENTIAL IMPACT ON PATENT EXAMINATION AND APPEAL 
This Part analyzes the potential impact of adopting the test described in 
Part III on patent examination and appeal processes. It submits that arguing the 
factors discussed above in a response to rejections from the PTO might reduce 
the need for appeals and therefore reduce the financial burden on the applicant. 
This Part also considers the burden that would be placed on examiners, their 
supervisors, and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) if the test were 
adopted and attempts to dispel any concerns with that burden. 
When the process of patent prosecution is conducted fairly and adequately 
by the PTO and the examiner, the proposed framework will bear this out. 
When the examiner pauses to consider whether a combination of references 
would reasonably be considered by a PHOSITA and concludes that it would, 
the examiner has fulfilled her procedural duty under the proposed framework, 
even if the substance of her decision may be debated by the prosecuting 
attorney. To the extent that a rejection is based on impermissible hindsight, the 
factors considered should reveal this to be true. When a rejection is sound, the 
factors considered should bear this out as well. The task of arguing to the 
examiner that she has relied upon impermissible hindsight when examining the 
case at hand is a delicate one, but it may be a more attainable task for 
applicants who cannot yet produce evidence of the secondary considerations of 
Graham. 
Adopting this test could also reduce the financial burden of patent 
prosecution. In the current process, if an examiner refuses to allow claims that 
the prosecuting attorney maintains are nonobvious, the best recourse available 
is to file an appeal. The appeal process can be expensive when considering the 
appeal fees imposed by the PTO as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees, 
especially when compared to the cost of filing an application, and may be 
overly burdensome for small entity inventors.201 The recently passed America 
Invents Act reduced all patent-prosecution- and appeal-related fees for small 
and micro entities,202 which suggests congressional policy concern about the 
cost to small businesses of obtaining and maintaining a patent portfolio. 
Because adopting this test could reduce the need for appeals, it could similarly 
reduce the financial burden on entities small and large when faced with 
rejections on arguably nonobvious subject matter. 
 
 201 See Fee Schedule—Patent Trial and Appeal Fees, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee010114.htm#appeal (last revised Mar. 1, 2015). 
 202 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10(b), 125 Stat. 284, 316–18 (2011). 
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Some would argue that considering ten factors as part of a larger test 
unduly burdens the examiner or anyone reviewing the examiner’s work, 
including a supervisor or the PTAB. This Comment submits that the 
framework proposed here is an even-handed one: the burden is placed on both 
the examiner and the prosecuting attorney. The examiner will need to be more 
deliberate and thoughtful in making rejections, and the prosecuting attorney 
will have an avenue through which to assess whether those rejections are based 
upon impermissible hindsight. Moreover, multifactor tests are currently used in 
other areas of patent law: the eight Wands factors for enablement,203 the 
thirteen factors for experimental use,204 and of course the four Graham factors 
already discussed in this Comment at length.205 In addition, other legal fields 
commonly employ multifactor tests. One closely related example is the test for 
likelihood of confusion in trademark law, which most jurisdictions apply as an 
eight- or nine-factor test.206 
The particular framework proposed in this Comment not only echoes the 
ease of multifactor tests commonly utilized in patent law as well as other 
fields, but it also embodies the flexibility that the Supreme Court emphasized 
with respect to obviousness determinations in KSR. None of the factors 
proposed here are dispositive, but they must be considered in the totality of the 
circumstances. Applying tests similar to the one proposed here is a burden 
commonly shouldered by courts and one that should be easily borne by 
examiners whenever the need may arise. If the burden of applying the test is 
not shouldered by examiners, patent attorneys are left with little to 
counterbalance the possibility that an examiner has impermissibly relied upon 
hindsight to reject the applicant’s patent claims as obvious. Requiring the 
examiner to shoulder the burden of the framework described in Part III 
admittedly places a large burden on examiners as well as their supervisors, but 
the benefit of adopting such a framework—providing recourse to patent 
applicants who may otherwise be unfairly deprived of patent claims they 
deserve—outweighs the cost. 
 
 203 See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 204 See Electromotive Div. of Gen. Motors Corp. v. Transp. Sys. Div. of Gen. Elec. Co., 417 F.3d 1203, 
1213 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 205 See supra Part I.A. 
 206 See Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961). The likelihood of confusion 
factors originated in the Polaroid case but are also well known as the “DuPont factors.” See In re E.I. DuPont 
de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973); see also Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 
1, 18 (1966) (noting that the judiciary routinely faces complicated inquiries, using negligence and scienter as 
examples). 
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CONCLUSION 
The issue of obviousness has been one of the most difficult determinations 
in patent law since the passage of the Patent Act of 1952. One of the foremost 
concerns within the requirement of obviousness has been the fear of hindsight 
bias affecting the determination. To combat that possibility, the Federal Circuit 
developed the bright-line rule of the TSM test. Though the Supreme Court 
attempted to clarify the standard for obviousness in KSR by rejecting the use of 
the TSM test as the sole test for obviousness, many questions remain 
unanswered, including how to best guard against the use of impermissible 
hindsight during patent examination. 
This Comment has proposed a framework for evaluating whether an 
examiner has relied upon impermissible hindsight to reject a patent as obvious 
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 during the examination process. Recognizing that some 
degree of hindsight is necessarily employed in patent examination, the 
proposed framework utilizes a number of factors, considered in the totality of 
the circumstances, that will focus the hindsight inquiry specifically on whether 
the degree of hindsight relied upon by the examiner has crossed the threshold 
between allowable, unavoidable hindsight and the bias of impermissible 
hindsight. Most of the factors are drawn from questions that courts have 
considered important to the overall determination of patentability, or in some 
cases obviousness in particular, and this Comment suggests that all of these 
factors bear on the question of hindsight. 
 The adoption of the proposed framework would provide a strategy for 
patent practitioners to argue that an examiner must have relied upon 
impermissible hindsight to reject a claim as obvious. In some cases, the 
framework may weigh against the applicant, as is the nature of any balancing 
test. However, the goal of this Comment’s proposed framework is not to 
always weigh in favor of the applicant but rather to provide an avenue for 
discussion among the applicant, the examiner, and if necessary the PTAB or 
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patent system is to properly weigh the interest of the inventor in protecting her 
invention while granting patents only for significant leaps in innovation. 
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